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 Abstract 
 This article argues for the relevance of interpretivism within theoretical and normative 
debates about international law. To do this, the article carries out two tasks. First, it draws 
out the central features of interpretivism that make it a theoretically distinct contribution to 
understanding the nature and theory of law. Secondly, it identiﬁ es four important objections, 
two external and two internal, to the relevance of interpretivism to international law. Exter-
nal objections stem from positivism and anti-essentialism about international law. Internal 
objections, on the other hand, stem from the view that international law does not suit the 
application of interpretivism. I show that it is possible to counter all four and conclude by 
pointing to the nature of future work that needs to be undertaken to develop a substantive 
interpretivist account of international law. 
 1   Introduction 
 Interpretivism 1 as a general theory of law has been received with indifference by theo-
rists of international law. 2 A principal reason for this, according to Beckett, is that the 
work of Ronald Dworkin, the pioneer of legal interpretivism, concerns the attributes 
of law in a single political community and, therefore, does not have anything to say 
 *  Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University College London. Email:  b.cali@ucl.ac.uk. 
 1  R. Dworkin,  Law’s Empire (1986) and R. Dworkin,  Justice in Robes (2006). 
 2  Aspects of Dworkin’s interpretivism have been applied to particular sectors in international law: e.g., the 
adjudication at the European Court of Human Rights: Letsas,  ‘ The Truth in Autonomous Concepts: How to 
Interpret the ECHR ’ , 15  EJIL (2004) 279; and customary international law: Tasioulas,  ‘ In Defence of Relative 
Normativity: Communitarian Values and the Nicaraguan Case ’ , 1  OJLS (1996) 85; Tasioulas,  ‘ Customary 
International Law and the Quest for Global Justice’, in A. Perreau-Saussine and J.B. Murphy (eds),  The 
Nature of Customary Law: Philosophical, Historical and Legal Perspectives (2007), at 307. These works, 
however, do not concern the relevance and applicability of interpretivism to general international 
law. 
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about international law. 3 This is correct in the literal sense. Dworkin has not written a 
full-length treatment of international law. His views refer to single political communi-
ties as background conditions for his substantive views on law. 4 Dworkin, however, 
has written on the nature of law as a normative social practice and the adequacy and 
weaknesses of rival doctrinal philosophical camps such as legal positivism, pragma-
tism, natural law, legal realism, and anti-foundationalism in accounting for that 
normative nature. 5 Given that all these doctrinal philosophical camps have extended 
to discussions on the normative nature of international law, irrespective of the fact 
that their roots are in the jurisprudence of domestic law, 6 it is surprising that interpre-
tivism has not received a comparable amount of attention. 
 The central aim of this article is to supply an argument for the relevance of inter-
pretivism to the theoretical and normative debates about international law and its 
central claim that law is an interpretive concept. While I draw liberally on Dworkin’s 
discussion of interpretivism, my argument is certainly not a second-guessing of 
Dworkin’s views on international law. 7 More importantly still, my aim is  not to advo-
cate a transfer of the substantive views that Dworkin has on the meaning of law in a 
single political community onto international law. 8 That would be a different project 
all together. My aim is to identify what insights interpretivism could provide to 
international lawyers in understanding international law. 
 This article is composed of two parts which correspond to the two key tasks that 
have to be completed in order to show the relevance of interpretivism to the general 
theory and practice of international law. The ﬁ rst task is to draw out what the central 
features of interpretivism are which make it a theoretically distinct contribution to 
understanding the nature of law. This will be done in the second section of the article 
by giving an account of the central assumptions of interpretivism and how it goes 
 3  Beckett,  ‘ Behind Relative Normativity: Rules and Process as Prerequisites of Law ’ , 12  EJIL (2001) 
627. 
 4  Dworkin’s defence of liberal egalitarianism in political philosophy, too, fundamentally concerns itself 
with principles as to how sovereigns ought to treat their citizens. See generally R. Dworkin,  The Sovereign 
Virtue (2000); J. Burley (ed.),  Dworkin and His Critics (2004); R. Dworkin,  Is Democracy Possible Here?: 
Principles for a new Political Debate (2008). 
 5  See in particular Dworkin,  Justice in Robes, supra note 1. 
 6  On positivism see generally Weil,  ‘ Towards Relative Normativity in International Law? ’ , 77  AJIL (1983) 
413; Nardin,  ‘ International Pluralism and the Rule of Law ’ , 26  Rev Int’l Studies (2000) 95; Simma and 
Paulus,  ‘ The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conﬂ icts: A Positivist 
View ’ , 93  AJIL (1999) 302. On Pragmatism, see A. M. Slaughter,  A New World Order (2004). On anti-
foundationalism see M. Koskenniemi,  From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argu-
ment (2nd edn, 2006); D. Kennedy,  The Structure of Legal Argument (1986). See also Çali,  ‘ How would 
You Like your Change Done Today, Madame? ’ , ESIL Inaugural Conference International Legal Theory 
Agora Paper, available at:  www.esil-sedi.eu/english/pdf/Cali.PDF ; and T. Nardin,  Law, Morality and the 
Relations of States (1999). 
 7  Indeed at some crucial points my conception of interpretivism may take a different direction from 
Dworkin’s. 
 8  On an attempt to transfer some of the views in Dworkin’s account of law onto the international plane see 
T. Franck,  Fairness in International Institutions (1995); M. T. A. Brus,  Third Party Dispute Settlement in an 
Interdependent World: Developing a Theoretical Framework (1995); and Tasioulas,  ‘ International Law and 
the Limits of Fairness ’ , 13  EJIL (2002) 993. 
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about identifying law as a unique social practice. The second task is to identify the possible 
objections to interpretivism’s relevance to international law, assess how successful 
these objections are, and illustrate how they may be countered. This is done in the 
third section by identifying two types of objections to the relevance of interpretivism 
to international law: external and internal. External objections dispute interpretiv-
ist premises by invoking alternative premises. Internal objections stem from the view 
that Dworkinian interpretivism is not a suitable theory to apply to international law. 
I conclude by showing why interpretivism is an important and worthwhile approach 
to the central questions of international law. I also sketch out the nature of work that 
needs to be undertaken in the future to develop a substantive interpretivist account of 
international law. 
 2   Interpretivism and the Nature of Law 
 Interpretivism, as I shall understand it here, is a theory on the nature of law. 9 This 
means that it is committed to an understanding of the very concept of law rather than 
its particular manifestations in different times and places. 10 Asking  what is law is 
different from asking  what is the law on a particular issue in a particular place because the 
former specializes in whether the idea of law has a nature, whether it has certain fea-
tures by its very nature, and whether it has those features wherever it exists. Proposi-
tions on the nature of law, however, have an effect on how the law is identiﬁ ed on a 
particular issue because they make general claims about the procedure that needs to 
be followed in order to identify the law. A key problem to which theories on the nature 
of law have to respond is the problem of how to differentiate law from non-law phe-
nomena. Law co-exists alongside other concepts, most notably morality, politics, and 
habit, and the way in which its relationship with these other concepts is conceived is 
integral to setting out what law means. Any theory on the nature of law has to show 
which space law occupies and what function it serves that other concepts do not. 
 The central premise of interpretivism in responding to the issues above is to assert 
that law is an interpretative concept as opposed, signiﬁ cantly, to a neutral concept. 11 
The key distinction between these two is that neutral concepts do not rely on contest-
able premises, whereas interpretive ones do. 12 A contestable premise is a premise that 
people agree is important, but disagree about where that importance lies. Neutral 
 9  Stravropoulos,  ‘ Interpretivist Theories of Law ’ ,  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at:  http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/law-interpretivist/ (accessed on 1 May 2008); A. Marmor,  Law and Interpreta-
tion: Essays in Legal Philosophy (1995). 
 10  Theories on the nature of law in this respect are categorically different from theories of explanation of 
how law operates or how it constrains behaviour or when it is effective. Examples of the latter genre of 
scholarship are generally produced in the ﬁ eld of international relations or by international law scholars 
interested in theories of explanation. See representatively A. M. Slaughter,  A Liberal Theory of International 
Law and J. L. Goldsmith and E. A. Posner,  The Limits of International Law (2007). Theories of explanation, 
however, inevitably have assumptions (implicit or explicit) on the nature of international law. 
 11  Dworkin,  Law’s Empire, supra note 1, at 12. 
 12  Dworkin,  Justice in Robes, supra note 1, at 10 – 11. 
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concepts, on the other hand, can be reported. People may disagree about the accuracy 
of the reporting, but they would not disagree about what the thing is that is reported. 
 When a concept is identiﬁ ed as interpretive a number of characteristics of that 
concept are revealed: 1. there exists a shared practice in which a group participates; 2. 
participants in the group treat the concept as interpretive by disagreeing about what the 
practice  really requires; 3. interpreters assign value and purpose to the practice and they 
form views about what particular propositions about the practice are true or false in the 
light of the values and purposes of the practice; 13 4. the interpreter is constrained by the 
history or the shape of the object of the practice in understanding its purpose. 14 
 Dworkin argues that law ﬁ ts all four characteristics and is, thus, better understood 
as an interpretive concept. Whether propositions about law are true or false cannot be 
a neutral description of a legal practice because interpreters have theoretical disagree-
ments about what the practice requires. 15 Even the statement that  ‘ we must simply 
describe the law ’ does not escape from the general claim that this is yet another inter-
pretation of the practice. This means that anyone who is involved in the practice of 
identifying the law does not merely describe the practice, its texts, and conventions, 
but states that he or she engages in a justiﬁ cation of it by identifying the object and 
the purpose of the practice. This is why interpretation, from the perspectives of its 
participants, has a constructive quality. 16 Justiﬁ cation, as opposed to description, is 
necessary because a group of interpreters of law disagree about what the practice 
 really requires. Even in the case of full agreement on the empirical facts of a situation, 
there is disagreement about what the law says. 17 This disagreement, however, is con-
strained by the history of law. 
 Interpretivism deﬁ nes this disagreement as one about what values lie  at the heart 
of the law. 18 The values that lie at the heart of law refer to propositions about prac-
tices that people are obliged to accept, rather than propositions people just happen to 
ﬁ nd valuable. 19 International humanitarian law on targeting, for example, could be 
regarded as valuable because it helps, for instance, soldiers to predict the behaviour 
of their enemies, journalists to report hostilities more safely, and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross to operate. The values at the heart of rules of targeting, 
however, are to save lives (of civilians) and to reduce the suffering of those targeted 
(combatants). 20 The values at the heart of a practice, therefore, serve the purpose of 
 13  Ibid., at 11 – 12. 
 14  It is for this reason that the interpretation is constructive. See also Dworkin,  Law’s Empire ,  supra note 1, 
at 52. 
 15  Dworkin,  Justice in Robes, supra note 1, at 140. 
 16  This view is closely connected to earlier philosophical works on interpretation by Heiddeger and Gadamer 
as it puts responsibility onto the shoulders of the interpreter for the very existence and sustainability of 
the object of inquiry: H. Gadamer,  Truth and Method (trans. J. Weinsheimer and D.G. Marshall, 1989); M. 
Heiddeger,  Being and Time (trans J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, 1962), sect. 32. 
 17  For an illustration for this position see Rodley and  Çali,  ‘ Revisiting Kosovo: Humanitarian Intervention 
on the Faultlines of International Law ’ 7  Human Rts L Rev (2007) 275. 
 18  Dworkin,  Justice in Robes ,  supra note 1, at 141. 
 19  I am indebted to S. Meckled-Garcia for drawing my attention to this distinction. 
 20  T. Meron,  Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (1989). 
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making sense of the key aspects of a practice. The argument about what value(s) lie at 
the heart of law indicates that without that value at work, one cannot talk about law 
in any meaningful way at all. The values at the heart of law need to be able to perform 
a number of tasks:
 1.  They have to show that the values are distinct to law. 
 2.  The values must be widely accepted as  ‘ real ’ values in the practice of law. 
 3.  They should provide guidance on which propositions about what the law is on a 
particular issue are true. 
 4.  They have to be comprehensive enough to justify sources of law and reasons to 
follow the law. 21 
 Dworkin argues that even though there are substantive values which underlie 
different interpretative conceptual cases, the procedure for identifying the value(s) 
remains the same. 22 The interpretivist method demands that one ﬁ rst has to identify 
the type of practice in which one is engaged and then, given its type, to present this 
practice in the best possible light. An oft-cited quotation from  Law’s Empire makes this 
point by deﬁ ning constructive interpretation as  ‘ a matter of imposing purpose on an 
object in order to make the best possible example of the form or genre to which it is 
taken to belong ’ . 23 Dworkin uses the heuristic concepts of  ‘ ﬁ t ’ and  ‘ justiﬁ cation ’ in 
order to explain the relationship between the practice and the value at its heart. 24 The 
value or the scheme of values has to  ﬁ t and  justify the practice in the sense that without 
that value we lose our claim to talk about that particular practice. 
 What constitutes ﬁ t between the value and the practice itself has to come in the 
form of an argument explaining the signiﬁ cant aspects of the practice and what makes 
sense of these aspects in terms of a value. Dworkin does not develop a list of necessary 
and sufﬁ cient conditions for ﬁ t. From Dworkin’s overall discussion, however, it seems 
that such conditions will have to include (a) the role the practice plays in the domain 
it operates; (b) the point of having the practice; (c) the differences of the practice from 
other practices that seem similar (or the distinct contribution or added value of the 
practice). 25 
 Interpretivism as a method applies to all interpretive conceptual cases, and when 
Dworkin applies it to law he addresses his interpretive theory to a particular legal 
culture where the key concern is the justiﬁ cation of monopoly of state coercion over 
individuals. Dworkin argues that the most signiﬁ cant aspect of law in a single political 
community is that it demands that state conduct  vis-à-vis individuals is in accordance 
with standards which are established in the right way before the conduct takes place. 26 
This key aspect of law has a dual character: there is the duty of conduct according to a 
 21  Dworkin,  Justice in Robes ,  supra note 1, at 169, although Dworkin does not address point (4) in an explicit 
way. 
 22  Ibid., at 145 – 162. 
 23  Dworkin,  Law’s Empire, supra note 1, at 52. 
 24  Dworkin,  Justice in Robes, supra note 1, at 169 – 171. 
 25  Ibid . 
 26  Ibid . 
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set of standards and there is the requirement that these standards precede the conduct 
and are established according to some correct procedure. This dual characteristic is 
something that law does not share with other concepts, and it is hard to talk about law 
 per se without it. Dworkin argues that the value which makes the most sense of this 
dual notion is legality. Legality is a value unique to law and gives law its fundamental 
character. 
 Dworkin believes that the idea of legality in its abstract formulation is uninforma-
tive and remains to be speciﬁ ed. Specifying it requires ﬁ nding what legality  really 
is by confronting the question of legality’s value. 27 Dworkin proposes that a value’s 
value can be identiﬁ ed by  ‘ locating that value’s place in a larger web of conviction ’ . 28 
Dworkin’s point is that political values, such as legality, justice, or democracy, exist 
because they make a contribution to some other independently identiﬁ able deeper 
value. 29 Precise meanings of values emerge by identifying that very contribution. It 
is for this reason that values exist in a web of conviction and a value cannot be fully 
understood without taking into account where the place of that value lies in a 
constellation of values. 
 What, then, is legality’s value? Dworkin argues that the real value of legality lies 
in its contribution to the coherent treatment of individuals by the state. Legislators 
ought to keep law coherent in principle, and past decisions which are decided in the 
correct way ought to bind future ones because law aims for equal concern and respect 
for individuals. Dworkin calls this  ‘ law as integrity ’ and argues that this is the best 
way to make sense of legality in a single political community. 30 The reason to demand 
application of equality in the application of standards is to be able to show equal con-
cern for all individuals in a community. Integrity is a function of a genuine commu-
nity which shows equal concern for all individuals. 31 
 The central thrust of Dworkin’s argument about the point and purpose of law then 
is an invitation to conceive law in a particular way: a branch of moral and politi-
cal philosophy with a commitment to ﬁ t the shape and history of legal practice as 
understood in a speciﬁ c context. Dworkin, furthermore, insists that this is the correct 
way of conceiving law. It is the correct description of what participants in the position 
to interpret the law do. On the substantive value of legality and its signiﬁ cance, the 
value of equal concern for the individuals who make up a community is centre-stage 
in Dworkinian interpretivism. 
 3   External Objections 
 External objections to interpretivism are those which are sceptical of interpretivism 
as a jurisprudential approach and its success in accounting for the nature of law by 
 27  Ibid., at 156. 
 28  Ibid . 
 29  Ibid., at 159. 
 30  Dworkin,  Law’s Empire ,  supra note 1, at 225 – 258, 410. 
 31  Ibid., at 188. 
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declaring it an interpretive concept. 32 Positivist and anti-essentialist conceptions of 
law, dominant also in contemporary international law discussions, harbour strong 
external objections to interpretivism 33 This is because they hold rival accounts of 
what speciﬁ c domain law  – and international law  – occupy in human relations. 34 In 
this section of the article, I identify two possible strands of external objections. The 
ﬁ rst strand doubts whether interpretivism is really a theory about what the law is. 
The second gives voice to pessimism about the interpretive method and whether 
it is possible to identify a coherent value system underlying international law which 
would receive general acceptance. 
 A   Interpretivism is Not about lex lata, but about lex ferenda 
 The ﬁ rst objection doubts whether interpretivism offers any insights about what the 
law is. Moreover, it asks if the theory should be more appropriately viewed as belong-
ing to the zone of what the law ought to be. If interpretivism is one type of natural law 
theory in disguise, it does not bring any new insights into international law. Objec-
tions to natural law theories apply to interpretivism, the central one being that it 
compromises the neutrality and distinctiveness of law by conﬂ ating it with  ‘ natural 
reason, moral principles and political ideologies ’ . 35 
 This objection, therefore, is, in its essence, a standard positivist objection to theo-
ries which call for moral judgement to ﬁ gure in legal propositions. 36 International 
legal positivism, classically defended by Prosper Weil, holds that the content of law 
is derived from phenomena which can be accounted for in the real world in order 
to maintain the distinction between law and  ‘ law as it should be ’ . 37 Conﬂ ating law 
and morality is an undesirable attitude, given that every single interpreter may have 
a different set of moral values which she or he thinks makes the practice meaning-
ful. This would not lead to an adequate interpretation of international law; rather, it 
 32  On various strands of positivists attacks on Dworkin’s interpretivism see J. Coleman,  The Practice of Prin-
ciple: In Defense of a Pragmatic Approach to Legal Theory (2001); J. Raz,  Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays 
in the Morality of Law and Politics (1994). On whether interpretivism and critical legal studies address 
the same type of theoretical concerns see Waldron,  ‘ Did Dworkin Ever Answer the Crits? ’ and Dworkin 
 ‘ Reply ’ in S. Hershowitz (ed.),  Exploring Laws Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin (2006), at 155 
and 298. On the anti-essentialist claim to impossibility of objectivity see Dworkin,  ‘ Objectivity and Truth: 
You’d Better Believe It ’ , 25  Philosophy and Public Affairs (1996) 87; N. Stavropoulos,  Objectivity in Law 
(1996). 
 33  Here, I do not treat positivism and anti-essentialism about international law as singular and uniﬁ ed 
theories. There are indeed different versions of both and internal disagreements within them. I, however, 
assume that there are some overarching views which are shared enough by members of these approach-
es to qualify some objections as positivist or anti-essentialist. 
 34  Unlike positivism and anti-essentialism, legal realism, which has strongly inﬂ uenced the process school 
of international law, shares a number of similarities with interpretivism. Both doctrines hold that the 
practice of international law is sensitive to values. See, e.g., McDougal,  ‘ Some Basic Theoretical Concepts 
about International Law: A Policy Orientated Framework of Inquiry ’ , 4  J Conﬂ ict Resolution (1960) 337. 
 35  Simma and Paulus,  supra note 6, at 304. 
 36  The classic defence of this positivist objection to moral values has been famously defended by Prosper 
Weil: see Weil,  supra note 6, at 421. 
 37  Ibid ., at 414 – 418. 
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would undermine interpretation. When morality is called on to determine the content 
of international law there is an important danger: the views of the mighty may win 
over the views of the weak. This would undermine the equal application of law to all 
cases, and law will lose its appeal to law’s followers as a distinct entity from morality. 38 
In the context of international law this is particularly worrying, as the discrepancy of 
power (material and resource based) between states is signiﬁ cant, and there is a real 
danger that the substantive moral views of a handful of states will determine what 
the law is. 39 The de-centralized character of international law is vulnerable to strong 
individual states asserting their own views as the law. 40 This objection identiﬁ es the 
solution to this problem by objecting to views that encourage moral judgement to 
ﬁ gure in legal judgment. What is required is to deﬁ ne law by reference to social facts 
describable as such  – for instance: intentions, secondary rules, and practices rather 
than moral reasoning. 41 
 This objection can be countered in two different ways. First, the legal positivist solu-
tion to the moral judgement problem suffers from internal difﬁ culties. The largest of 
these is that legal positivism is not clear how a social fact by itself can bind anything, 42 
especially in the de-centralized system of international law. Even if we identify that 
there is a social fact that is widely valued in the real world, we still cannot explain why 
that binds anyone. By basing law on social facts, legal positivism aims to steer clear 
of moral judgement and makes an intuitive assertion that morality is not a necessary 
condition for law to exist. It, however, takes the argument too far and ignores the fact 
that a degree of moral judgement is required even for basic tasks such as deciding 
which social facts are more signiﬁ cant in a particular case to determine how the law 
applies to those facts. One does not need to believe that morality determines law in 
order to hold that law and morality interact with one another in subtle ways in our 
everyday practice of law application. 43 
 Secondly, for this objection to succeed we must concede that there is not a sig-
nificant difference between interpretivism and moral theories of international law. 
Interpretivism, contrary to this positivist objection, does not aim to establish moral 
foundations for an entity by treating the practice of that entity as merely contingent. 44 
It requires an account of which values best justify an  existing practice. It, therefore, 
 38  Nardin,  Law, Morality, supra note 6, at 15 – 16. 
 39  For a radical defence of this view see H. Morgenthau,  Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace (1948). 
 40  On strong state unilateralism see M, Byers and G. Nolte (eds),  United State Hegemony and the Foundations 
of International Law (2003). 
 41  For a full account of law as a description of social convention see H.L.A. Hart,  The Concept of Law (1961). 
 42  Traditional positivism, developed by Austin, explains the binding nature of law by deﬁ ning law as the 
 ‘ command of the sovereign ’ . This view still does not explain why social facts bind anyone. It argues this 
binding nature is derived from coercion or the power of the sovereign, as opposed to moral obligation: J. 
Austin,  The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (ed. W. Rumble, 1995), Lecture 1. 
 43  For an interactive view on law and morality see P. Cane,  Responsibility in Law and Morality (2002), at 
12 – 15. 
 44  For approaches in this genre see, for example, F. Teson,  A Philosophy of International Law (1998); A. 
Buchanan,  Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law ( 2004). 
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stays in the messy business of establishing what the law is through a heuristic cycle 
of studying the practice and asking what the point of the practice is. This is what 
Dworkin calls a  ‘ theory embedded view of practice ’ . 45 Interpretivism accepts that law 
emerges from the activities of authoritative institutions, but also holds the view that 
 ‘ the law these activities create is not ﬁ xed by the crude function of these activities ’ . 46 
It insists that the establishment of what the law is requires a more complex form of 
analysis. Interpretivism, in this respect, also has a historically-embedded view of the 
practice. This is because what is meant by practice is not an isolated instance of it, but 
an analysis of practices  ‘ over time and in continuous interaction ’ . 47 
 In the context of public international law the objection that interpretivism imposes 
individual morality on law collapses, as interpretivism would insist that the need to 
ﬁ ght morally dubious views of individual states is a concern that the interpreter has 
to take into account in identifying the value system of international law. Such views 
cannot claim to be the values at the heart of international law as they fail to fulﬁ l the 
necessary condition that the value of the system cannot be something that happens to 
be valuable to some. Indeed, one may even go a step further and argue that constrain-
ing individual political units (i.e. states) so that they do not take matters into their own 
hands is one of the key aspects of de-centralized international law. In other words, 
the value of legality at the heart of Dworkin’s interpretation of law has signiﬁ cance in 
international law in the sense that it captures the strong intuition that no state can 
determine what international law is based on its subjective assessments. 
 B   Interpretivism and Value Pluralism 
 The second objection concerns the desirability and feasibility of interpretivism. It raises 
doubts about whether imposing purpose on a practice, such as international law, is 
desirable or feasible. Such a project may not be desirable because imposing purpose 
on a practice necessarily opens a Pandora’s Box. There may a number of values that 
can be imposed on this practice which may be hard to reconcile. Here, another level 
of concern is that every interpreter can impose his or her own purpose or different 
purposes to the practice. 48 This would mean that agents are not interpreting the law, 
but inventing it based on their substantive views and preferences. 49 This may further 
bar international law from providing normative guidance to all states. 50 
 We can construct two versions of this scepticism about value pluralism: positivistic 
and anti-essentialist. The positivist version is sceptical about the very idea of impos-
ing a value on the practice of international law as it views this as undermining the 
objectivity of international law. The objectivity of international law can be attained 
only by following procedures which authoritatively produce law. The positivistic 
 45  Dworkin,  Justice in Robes, supra note 1, at 51. 
 46  Ibid., at 384. 
 47  Ibid., at 384 – 385. 
 48  Beckett,  supra note 3, at 630. 
 49  Weil,  supra note 6, at 441. 
 50  Ibid ., at 440 – 441. 
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understanding of treaty and custom is a manifestation of this view. Treaty and custom 
are legally binding sources of international law because they are validated by state 
consent. Treaties enable this by the creation of a convention through formal proce-
dures. Customary norms exist because state practices converge with the intention to 
follow a legal norm. Authoritative procedures themselves can be messy because of the 
political nature of law-making, and it is possible that some international laws are not 
just. They are, however, objective. They do not serve the interests of any single political 
community as such. 
 The problem with this type of defence of the objectivity of international law is that it is 
not clear why any of these processes are value-free in the ﬁ rst place. It is clear that this 
account puts a great deal of emphasis on the participation of states in law-making proc-
esses, on the history of past practices of states, and on the importance of following the 
correct procedures. An interpretivist theory of international law does not have a reason 
to dispute these emphases because they are central to understanding international law. 
In other words, the insistence on authoritative decision-making procedures can also be 
viewed as reﬂ ective of values which we identify as important in the practice of interna-
tional law. Positivism as a normative defence of state consent, in this respect, is not an 
external objection to interpretivism: it is an interpretive theory of international law. 51 
 The positivistic value-free claim on the content of law also faces problems of coher-
ence. Some of the central doctrinal questions of international law owe their presence 
to such incoherences. 52 At what point does the practice of a number of states harden 
into customary international law? What happens when half of the states violate a rule 
and the other half follow it? 53 These questions are not answered only by looking at 
the authoritative practices of states. Even when it is possible to document and have a 
view about what the great number of states did in case X with respect to the harden-
ing of a customary international law, the problem remains. Consider the case of NATO 
intervention in Kosovo in 1999 which lacked authorization from the United Nations 
Security Council. Some states carried out or supported the intervention, while others 
strongly opposed it. This information on its own cannot establish what effects this 
mixed practice had on customary international law on humanitarian intervention. In 
the case of half of the states following and the other half violating the rule, neither side 
of cumulative convergent state behaviour on its own can tell us what the customary 
law is. We still need a theory on the relationship between treaty law and customary 
international law, what constitutes general practice in customary international law, 
and whether the violation of a treaty provision constitutes practice in the context of 
customary law. The proposition that international law is made by state consent with-
out inquiring into what role consent plays in a large web of convictions about the 
value of international law cannot adequately provide answers to these questions. 54 
 51  On this point see also Kingsbury,  ‘ Legal Positivism as Normative Politics: International Society, Balance 
of Power and Lassa Oppenheim’s Positive International Law ’ , 13  EJIL (2002) 401, at 402. 
 52  Rodley and  Çali,  supra note 17. 
 53  Akehurst,  ‘ Custom as a Source of International Law ’ , 47  BYBIL (1974 – 75) 1. 
 54  Indeed  ‘ modern positivism about international law ’ approaches consent as a means rather than an end 
in itself in international law: Simma and Paulus,  supra note 6, at 307 – 308. 
 On Interpretivism and International Law      815 
 Some positivist scholars explain such problems which stem from applying a positiv-
istic understanding of sources doctrine not as problems of legal theory, but as prob-
lems of the vagaries of politics. 55 Instead, the evaluative nature of (international) law 
is at the heart of these problems. A purely descriptive solution to the sources of inter-
national law ignores that there are competing sets of (legal) principles which inform 
legal positions. This disagreement requires making sense of the key aspects of interna-
tional law in order to identify what the law is. 56 International lawyers have to identify 
those key aspects under the institutional constraints of international law. The neces-
sity to pay due regard to authoritative decision-making procedures, and to do so in a 
coherent and consistent way, makes international legal evaluation distinctive from 
moral evaluation  per se . 
 The non-essentialist version of this view does not take issue with the desirability of 
identifying which values international law serves, but with the feasibility of reconcil-
ing these values. In fact, a non-essentialist agrees that there is indeed a plurality of 
values that international law may serve. 57 This is, however, part of the problem of 
international law. International law is a patchwork, made up of many diverse and 
conﬂ icting principles and agendas. It is not simply politically messy, as positivists 
claim; it is also conceptually messy. The anti-essentialist, however, takes this concep-
tual messiness a step further and asserts that it runs so deep in the nature of (interna-
tional) law that it makes it impossible to assert in an essentialist sense what the law 
is. 58 Instead of a singular international legal system, we simply have subjective pref-
erences of international actors dressed up in international legal language. 59 In other 
words, (international) law does not have procedures internal to its own functioning 
which can determine what makes propositions of law true or false. The very nature of 
international law is that it is made up of contradictions. 60 
 These statements are metaphysical in the sense that they claim to hold some 
deep knowledge about the very nature of law rather than ordinary disputes. They 
are removed from how international lawyers argue and establish international 
law in everyday discussions. In this respect, they impose an external point of view 
on the nature of international law and treat instances of agreement on what the 
law is. The anti-essentialist view on irreconcilable values is not reached through 
working out the relationship between values in ordinary situations. It is a general 
 55  Raz,  ‘ The Relevance of Coherence ’ , in J. Raz,  Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and 
Politics (1994), at 277, 298 – 300. 
 56  This does not mean that this is an easy task and that there is a clear answer for every single international 
legal problem. 
 57  In non-essentialist writings on international law, Koskenniemi identiﬁ es a number of binary oppositions 
 – such as those between facts and norms, between concreteness and normativity, and between apology 
and utopia  – which he regards as irreconcilable: Koskenniemi,  supra note 6, especially at 58 – 69. See also 
D. Kennedy,  The Structure of International Legal Argument (1986), who argues that sovereign autonomy 
and international autonomy pulls international legal argument in opposite directions. 
 58  Koskenniemi,  supra note 6, at 590. 
 59  Ibid ., at 616. 
 60  Ibid ., at 61 – 67. It is important to note that this statement itself has an essentialist feature. 
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statement based on a deep assumption that values conﬂ ict. Interpretivism would 
not deny the possibility that in some very difﬁ cult cases the analysis of the scheme 
of values that best justiﬁ es the practice can be inconclusive. It, however, does not 
follow that in some philosophical sense international law is unable to provide the 
right answers to competing legal claims. 61 In ordinary discussion many interna-
tional lawyers or stateswomen/statesmen are able to reach a determinate inter-
national legal decision by using international law’s resources, and without using 
personal or political preferences as the essential feature of the basis of the decision. 
We can say, for instance, that Israel, as a matter of international law, had a right 
to self-defence in the immediate aftermath of the attacks on its territory from south 
Lebanon in 2006. However, when it used its right to self-defence the conduct of its 
military operations was disproportionate, contrary to international law. 62 In the 
face of such agreement, the anti-essentialists have to state that  ‘ contrary to ordi-
nary lawyers ’ opinions, it is a legal mistake to think that there are right answers in 
hard cases ’ . 63 
 Interpretivism, therefore, is able to counter both the positivist and anti-essentialist 
objections to imposing a purpose on the practice of international law. With respect to 
the positivist challenge it shows that international law cannot do away with the values 
which enable us to make sense of the practice. With respect to the anti-essentialist 
challenge, it questions the premise of making mystical philosophical claims about 
international law by insisting on deep contradiction as an organizing value. The call 
of interpretivism for international legal theorists is to engage in the systematic analy-
sis of the very meaning of the values and procedures to identify the best justiﬁ cation 
in the face of competing values. Positivism and anti-essentialism attack this project 
even though their position too can be traced to some value scheme they support with 
respect to international law. 
 4   Internal Objections 
 Internal objections do not challenge interpretivism as a jurisprudential approach, but 
argue that the conditions for Dworkinian interpretivism to apply to the special case 
of international law are not met. This is because the larger web of conviction within 
which Dworkin locates law in the domestic case does not transfer to international law. 
International law is not law in the sense that interpretivism would have it be as it lacks 
the key aspects and characteristics that make sense of law as a social practice. I will 
focus on two versions of this internal objection in this section. The ﬁ rst is what I shall 
call the lack of community objection. The second is the lack of centrally-organized 
coercive institution objection. 
 61  Dworkin,  Justice in Robes, supra note 1, at 41 – 42. 
 62  See, e.g., Kirgis,  ‘ Some Proportionality Issues Raised by Israel’s Use of Armed Force in Lebanon ’ , 10  ASIL 
Insights (2006), available at:  www.asil.org/insights/2006/08/insights060817.html (accessed 1 June 
2008). 
 63  Dworkin,  Justice in Robes, supra note 1, at 43. 
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 A   There is No Genuine Value in the Community of States 
 This version of the objection holds that interpretivism as a theory of law relies on the 
very existence of community, and more importantly a community which is aimed 
at (not necessarily successfully) equal concern and respect for individual lives. Equal 
concern for its members is what gives a community its very meaning. 64 In interna-
tional law no such community exists. More importantly, international law allows for 
political communities which do not show equal respect and concern for individuals to 
have rights and obligations. 
 This objection rests on an integrated understanding of how the procedure of inter-
pretivism applies to the case of law. In order to apply interpretivism one has to believe 
that, for a body of practice to be law, there has to be coherence about how members of 
a community are treated by the legislative and the judiciary in the creation and appli-
cation of laws. 65 This conceptual demand of law is its value. Integrity, in turn, implies 
a speciﬁ c type of community: one which aims at equal concern and respect of its indi-
vidual members. Without the idea of equal concern and respect the whole point of 
integrity is lost. Dworkin conﬁ rms this view in  Law’s Empire by holding that  ‘ integrity 
holds within political communities, not among them ’ . 66 In fact, international society, 
if there is one, negates that very value by permitting membership to states which 
display no such aim towards individuals. 67 
 This objection needs unpacking as it hosts a number of complex ideas. First, there is 
the idea that interpretivism as a substantive theory or method makes sense only when 
a community exists which is deﬁ ned in a particular way. 68 A central feature of this 
community is that it is made up of individuals. As opposed to this, international law is 
a practice which invites a debate about whether there is any community, in any sense 
of the word, at all. In other words, the question is whether there is a unifying thread 
to bring the interpreters together in the ﬁ rst place. This view invokes the schematiza-
tion offered by Dworkin in  Law’s Empire when he describes the interpretive process. 
According to this scheme the process has three stages: (a) pre-interpretive; (b) inter-
pretive; (c) post-interpretive. 69 The objection then holds that international law does 
not successfully meet the conditions of a pre-interpretive stage, let alone an interpre-
tive stage. In order to assess this objection, therefore, the qualities of a pre-interpretive 
stage must be established. 
 Dworkin proposes two conditions in order to talk meaningfully about a pre-
 interpretive stage of a certain practice. The practitioners should share an attitude to 
the effect that (a) the practice does not  merely exist, but it has some purpose, and (b) 
the behaviour it calls for is sensitive to that purpose. 70 The  ‘ background noise ’ charge 
against international law, then, must show that it is not possible to pin down a point 
 64  Dworkin,  Law’s Empire, supra note 1, at 188 – 190. 
 65  Ibid., at 167. 
 66  Ibid., at 185. 
 67  For a contrasting view see Brus,  supra note 8. 
 68  Beckett,  supra note 3, at 634. 
 69  Dworkin,  Law’s Empire, supra note 1, at 65 – 68. 
 70  Ibid ., at 65 – 66. 
 818     EJIL  20 (2009),  805–822 
of international law and that the practice of international law is, at best, only insigniﬁ -
cantly linked to any value it may have. 
 A few problems with this objection are now easier to spot. This objection overplays 
the distinction between Dworkin’s use of community versus any other conception of 
community to settle the question whether international law is pre-interpretive or not. 
According to the conditions set out by Dworkin it is perfectly possible for a practice to 
have  ‘ pre-interpretive ’ qualities without being a practice representative of a commu-
nity aimed at equal concern. What is required is that practitioners share a common 
understanding of the purpose of the practice. 
 Consider this bare formulation of the key purpose of international law: It is to estab-
lish a framework to enable the conduct of international relations. 71 This is not merely 
a subjective view, but a shared understanding about what international law does or 
aims to do. This purpose is not a trivial part of the practice. The central disagreements 
revolve around what constitutes  ‘ conduct ’ in the international sphere, and where the 
boundaries of the framework lie, as opposed to domestic conduct of individuals, and 
how these rules of conduct are established. A central aspect of international law is 
that it does not give the same priority to individual human beings as domestic law 
because of the existence of multiple political communities. Individuals do, of course, 
exist in international law as right holders and responsibility bearers (i.e. in interna-
tional human rights law, international refugee law, international humanitarian law, 
and international criminal law). The difference, however, with domestic law is that 
their legal existence is secondary and not a constitutive part of the legal system. 72 
According to Dworkin, such debates are the very subject of the interpretive stage, 
when practitioners provide a justiﬁ cation of the practice. 
 If we agree that international law is not merely background noise, we can consider 
the deeper objection that it may well be that international law is an interpretive prac-
tice, but not one of law. I believe that the core of this objection is the argument that the 
value of integrity, which is a function of a special community aimed at equal concern, 
does not go over to international law. Integrity is a value which is achieved in a com-
munity and not between communities. 73 
 I agree with this objection. Integrity cannot do the work in international law that 
it does in domestic law because it responds to the circumstances of law in a single 
political community. The value of integrity is equality of respect for individuals. Solely 
focussing on equal respect for individuals in the case of international law does not 
take us far as the circumstances of law are different: there are multiple political com-
munities, each made up of individuals who belong to a single political community. 
It does not follow, however, that interpretivism has no contribution to make to our 
 71  J.L. Brierly,  The Law of Nations: An Introduction to International Law of Peace (1963), at 6. 
 72  I do not mean that individuals are not important or secondary to something else in international law. 
It is simply that international law does not directly regulate individuals  qua individuals. They have to 
qualify as a  ‘ victim ’ under international human rights law, to commit an  ‘ international crime ’ , to claim 
refugee status, or to ﬁ nd themselves in the midst of an international armed conﬂ ict. It is only then that 
they become rights holders or duty bearers in the international sphere. 
 73  Dworkin,  Law’s Empire, supra note 1, at 185. 
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understanding of the nature of international law. The way in which Dworkin repre-
sents integrity is the best conception of legality in the domestic case. 74 It is the more 
abstract value of legality which offers the distinct meaning to law as an interpretive 
concept. 75 Legality does go over to international law in form, but not in substance. The 
restatement of integrity as the best conception of legality in the domestic case makes it 
possible to counter the objection that interpretivism does not transfer to international 
law. It does not, however, answer the more fundamental question of what is the best 
conception of legality in the light of the key and signiﬁ cant aspects of international 
law. This is an ambitious task, which will have to address the value of legality in inter-
national law in the light of a larger web of convictions. 76 
 B   Interpretivism is Not a Theory of Law Proper, but a Theory of 
Adjudication 
 This objection, originally raised by Beckett, is based on the characterization of Dwor-
kinian interpretivism as a theory of adjudication rather than as a systematic theory of 
law. 77 Once this premise is accepted the objection follows that, given that adjudication 
is so peripheral to our understanding of international law, Dworkin’s theory is largely 
irrelevant to the problems with which theorists of international law are struggling to 
grapple. The lack of central authority in international law and its decentralized insti-
tutional identity, therefore, require a less adjudication-focussed and a more source- 
and obligation-focussed account of the nature of international law. 78 
 The central issue with this objection is whether it is accurate to equate interpretivism 
solely as a theory of adjudication, in the sense that its scope is limited to being a handbook 
for judges in deciding cases and that it is silent on issues of legislation and compliance. 
This objection is based on the assumption that how judges decide cases is a much more 
limited and specialized question than that of what law is. Beckett, for example, holds that 
international law is in need of  ‘ pre-adjudicative ’ theories on the existence and identiﬁ ca-
tion of law. 79 Does interpretivism only deal with the question of how to interpret the law 
and not at all with the questions of how law is made and who should interpret the law 
and why it should be obeyed? If the answer to this question were yes, then it would follow 
that the remit of interpretivism is limited and that it is not a theory of law as such. It may 
be a helpful way for judges to think about cases, but it is not a way of understanding what 
we mean by the law. Law is a wider notion than adjudication, and it needs to respond to 
questions beyond how judges should decide on cases. Interpretivism then does not explain 
the practice of law as a whole and has almost no signiﬁ cance for international law. 
 74  See in particular how integrity is compared with alternative conceptions of legality, namely accuracy 
and efﬁ ciency, in Dworkin,  Justice in Robes, supra note 1, at 171 – 176. 
 75  Ibid., at 178. 
 76  There have been works of international law theory which have focused on the rule of law as one mani-
festation of legality as a central aspect of international law. See, e.g., Nardin,  ‘ International Pluralism ’ , 
 supra note 6. 
 77  Beckett,  supra note 3, at 634 – 645. See also A. Marmor,  Interpretation and Legal Theory (2005). 
 78  Beckett,  supra note 3, at 635. 
 79  Ibid . 
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 The central problem with this view is its treatment of how judges should decide 
cases as a separate and signiﬁ cant category from that of law. It is correct that a gen-
eral theory of law begs questions beyond how judges should decide cases. How judges 
should decide cases, however, is a function of a general theory of law. In other words, 
it is not possible to develop a theory on the truth conditions of a proposition of law 
which is divorced from questions of who is entitled to make the law and who should 
enforce it. 
 In Dworkin’s domestic case there are a number of basic assumptions in place about 
the key aspects of the practice of law. First, Dworkin has in mind a  ‘ reasonably decent 
democracy ’ comprising the background facts of the domestic case. 80 The division 
of labour between a parliament which legislates and a judiciary which deploys the 
monopoly of a state’s coercive power towards individuals is a basic fact of the domestic 
case. Dworkin defends his focus on judges in  Law’s Empire by his aim to offer a theory 
of the structure of the legal argument and what counts as a good or bad argument 
 within the practice of law. His theory of law is from the internal participant’s point of 
view because it aims to understand law as an argumentative social phenomenon with 
practical consequences in ordinary life. 81 There is good reason to focus on judges in 
the domestic case because their decisions embody the deployment of the state’s coer-
cion  vis-à-vis individuals. Dworkin also assumes in the domestic case that there is a 
duty to obey the law, and this is related to the basic function of the law in the commu-
nity: equal concern towards all members of the community. 82 
 The realm of adjudication is ampliﬁ ed in Dworkinian interpretivism, not because 
interpretivism aims to offer only an understanding of adjudication, but because the 
practice of domestic law makes the focus on adjudication meaningful. The realm of 
adjudication in this respect ﬂ ows from foundational questions and doctrinal questions 
about law and the central features of the practice of domestic law. 83 
 In the international case, adjudication does not play a central role. This does not 
mean, however, that it plays no role. In speciﬁ c sectors, such as, for example, interna-
tional human rights law in Europe adjudication is highly relevant. 84 But even in cases 
where adjudication is relevant, it is not relevant for the same substantive reasons as 
it would be in the domestic case. International judges do not deploy the state’s mono-
poly of coercion in individual cases when they decide. International adjudication has 
to receive its substantive signiﬁ cance from an understanding of the basic facts of the 
international case, and this will require linking theories of adjudication in the interna-
tional case to theories of legislation, compliance, and enforcement. 
 80  Dworkin,  Justice in Robes, supra note 1, at 18. 
 81  The internal point of view stands in contrast to the external point of view which is interested in identifying 
patterns of legal argument which develop in different times and places. Dworkin points out however that 
these perspectives on law have to take each other into account: Dworkin,  Law’s Empire, supra note 1, at 
13 – 14. 
 82  Dworkin,  Justice in Robes, supra note 1, at 19. 
 83  Ibid., at 9 – 21. 
 84  It is also perhaps for this reason that Dworkinian interpretivism was ﬁ rst applied in a sectoral way to 
supranational adjudication of human rights in Europe: see Letsas,  supra note 1. 
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 Interpretive procedure, therefore, is not limited to adjudication in the domestic case. 
Its proper boundaries are determined by its aim to understand the law as an argumen-
tative practice and not from the point of view of a sociologist or a historian. In the case 
of international law, the correct question to ask is which agents constitute the most 
signiﬁ cant internal participants. Given that international law is made by states, but 
interpreted and implemented by states, international organizations, international and 
domestic courts, and quasi-judicial bodies, it is not adequate to focus single-handedly 
on judges. Internal participants are more adequately described as agents who have 
the capacity to affect the terms of international conduct. 
 5   Conclusion 
 My aim in this article has been to supply an argument for the relevance of interpre-
tivism in international law and examine the reasons for its current unpopularity by 
considering possible central objections to it. I have aimed to show that a number of 
misconceptions about interpretivism as a substantive theory and as a method can be 
identiﬁ ed as obstacles to developing fuller accounts of interpretivist theories of inter-
national law. I have also argued that the direct application of interpretivism to inter-
national law as  ‘ law as integrity ’ does not ﬁ t the practice of international law. I have 
not aimed to develop a full interpretivist theory of international law in this article. 
Mapping out what exactly such a theory requires in terms of purposes and their 
relationship to practice needs to be the subject of a separate study. 
 The analysis of the positivist objections has shown that positivism draws a different 
picture of interpretivism altogether. A central concern of positivist takes on interpre-
tivism is that it will lead to the imposition of values by individual actors rather than 
telling us anything about the very meaning of international law. A common thread 
which runs through these objections is that international law is such a fundamen-
tally different domain that introducing moral judgement will seriously impede the 
functioning of the system. I have argued, however, that this view itself voices a moral 
consideration: the necessity of controlling unilateral conduct, conviction, and action. 
I have further aimed to show that the anti-essentialist argument on the deep disagree-
ment about values remains highly abstract and does not show on what basis ordinary 
international lawyers or diplomats are able to agree when they do agree. 
 Internal objections to the application of interpretivism raise a number of complex 
issues about whether the values at the heart of law make sense in the international 
case. I have aimed to argue that legality is a value which goes over to international 
law in form, but not in substance. Legality  really matters for international law practice 
because without legality it is not possible to make a claim about the point of having an 
international law framework which guides international conduct. The very practice 
of international law has for its aim the constitution of an international community 
independent of the images that different political entities have of that community by 
setting standards to guide international conduct. There is, however, further work 
which remains to be done to show which conception of legality best ﬁ ts the practice of 
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international law, what these standards are, and what the correct procedure to estab-
lish these standards involves. It is clear, however, that such a conception of legality 
will have to start by taking into account the distinct value of international law as the 
framework for regulating conduct in international relations. 
 In a non-centralized legal order law does not function to distribute coercion, but 
to provide a framework within which everyone knows how their conduct falls under 
its scope and what it means. The deﬁ nition of conduct in this context will have to 
depart signiﬁ cantly from its deﬁ nition in the domestic case and has to focus on what is 
meant by international conduct, what acts in what kinds of circumstances fall under 
international conduct, and what the key aspects of that conduct are. Further work 
also needs to be done to clarify what an international framework is, how it operates 
in ﬁ ltering out which goals are acceptable, and how it enables co-operation towards 
achieving goals. 
 An interpretivist theory of international law, in this respect, will not appeal to values 
which are less important, less ambitious, or less virtuous than those of domestic law. It 
has to appeal to different values because of the kinds of concerns it responds to and the 
kinds of relationships it regulates. We also have to consider that values will have differ-
ent implications in domestic law and international law, such as in the cases of human 
rights law, criminal law, and tort law. Any model of law transferred from domestic 
law to make sense of international law will run into a similar kind of challenge. 85 
When the image of the success of a legal system is deﬁ ned in terms of its domestic 
characteristics (such as the existence of the sovereign, the existence of a centralized 
hierarchical system, the existence of legislature, the existence of universal adjudica-
tion, or equal concern for individuals) international law is bound to fail constantly. 
International law requires its own indicators to measure its success as the framework 
which regulates international conduct. A systematic analytical approach to the values 
at the heart of international law is integral to such a project. This approach will have 
to guard itself from charges of value-favouritism. The good news is that the complex 
practice and conduct of international law, at least since 1945, are on the side of the 
interpretivist. 
 85  On this point see R. Falk, The  Status of Law in International Society (1970), at 9. 
